Clarus Financial Technology

Could the Nasdaq default happen in Rates markets?

Following on from Amir’s blog last week, Default at Nasdaq Clearing, I went on to read some follow-up thoughts from Craig Pirrong, aka Streetwise Professor. His comments got me thinking – would a similar default be possible in a different asset class? Specifically, would it be possible in Rates markets?

CHARM Margin Optimisation

Margin models at Rates CCPs tend to be based upon historic look-backs, and we generally judge the likelihood of something happening in the future based on whether it has happened before. Our risk software, CHARM, includes a number of different margin models.

It was moves in power spreads (Nordics vs Germany) that caused the €100m hole in the Nasdaq default fund. Can we imagine a scenario that could cause a €100m hole in a default fund at a Rates CCP? Yes. How? Read on….

But first, I just want to clarify that I’ve seen daily moves of “17 times normal” quoted as the cause at Nasdaq, but I won’t use that here. I do not think it is credible to assume that moves in one asset class can translate to another.

Instead, we will use CHARM, our Margin Optimisation solution, to run margin and risk calculations to look at some hypothetical scenarios.

Spreads are a killer

Keeping with the Nordic theme, I’m going to take a look at Rates spreads in 10y NOK vs SEK IRS. This has the following advantages for this blog:

10y NOK IRS

Let’s start simple, with the margin for a standalone 10y NOK payer IRS at a major Rates CCP. We will use a risk size of €100k DV01 – which in this case equates to a NOK notional of NOK1bn for a 10 year trade.

10y SEK IRS

Now for standalone 10y SEK receiver IRS at a major Rates CCP. We will use a risk size of €100k DV01 again – which in this case equates to a SEK notional of SEK1.1bn for a 10 year trade.

No €100m Hole To See Here

For these trades, you can see how securely margined they are:

Massive Trades

What if I tried to trade huge amounts of risk?

Just to underline the above point:

Conclusion? Liquidity add-ons work at a single CCP. FCMs should have a duty with their clients to make sure that they are not putting on large positions at every CCP.

Our solution, CHARM, is ideally suited to monitor, manage and optimise margins for both FCMs and their clients – including massive trades!

10y NOK IRS vs 10y SEK IRS

What happens to the Initial Margin when we combine the two positions? i.e. I trade the spread NOK vs SEK:

The Rates CCP is offering a diversification benefit for trading these two swaps together. If I traded NOK at Eurex and SEK at LCH, then my Initial Margin requirement would be double, compared to clearing all of it at LCH (or all of it at Eurex).

What if this diversification benefit is inaccurate in the future? What if we should treat NOK moves and SEK moves as independent events? Based on worst case for NOK and worst case for SEK, that would mean moves on the spread of -66bp/+79bp.

For our €100k position, that means our Initial Margin would still only be €5m short of covering the moves! We are a long way from finding a €100m hole here…!

NOK vs SEK in huge size

It is important to note that liquidity add-ons in one currency do not cancel out liquidity add-ons in another currency as part of the diversification benefit.

However, what we could imagine happening is a complete breakdown of the historic relationship of these two products. So instead of moving together, a stress event might mean that SEK rates move UP and NOK rates move DOWN. So let’s see what the Initial Margin shortfall could be in this scenario:

Why we should NOT be worried by this €74m

This is a hypothetical scenario.

It is in very large size.

It would be a complete breakdown in historic moves.

We have multiplied a five-day move (of 30 basis points) and assumed that a much larger move could happen within the space of a single day (79 basis points).

We are assuming that a spread could move by 2.5 times it’s historic worst case scenario.

We are ignoring the fact that IM is called and calculated DAILY.

We are ignoring all of the risk controls that would kick-in following such a break-down.

And we ignore all other positions.

In light of which, I’m comfortable that the combination of diversification benefits and penal liquidity add-ons act as sufficient ways to mitigate the risk of bizarre margin offsets that might have occurred during historic periods.

I am also thankful to CHARM for helping me come to these conclusions – I can sleep better tonight as a result!

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